GitHub Actions

github-actionsCI/CD40 lines

Continuous integration and release automation running on GitHub.

Current — as published in v1.3.2. Written by hand for GitHub Actions, not generated.

The rule

Secrets

Repository or environment secrets only. A secret committed to a workflow file is leaked to everyone with read access, and rewriting history does not undo it.
Never echo a secret, and never pass one into an untrusted action.

Permissions

yaml

permissions:
  contents: read

Set explicitly at the top of every workflow. The default is broader than any test job needs, and a compromised action inherits whatever the job holds.

Actions

Pin third-party actions to a commit SHA, not a tag. Tags are mutable, and the action runs with access to your secrets.
First-party actions/* at a major version tag is acceptable.

Fork pull requests

pull_request deliberately withholds secrets from forks.
Never switch to pull_request_target to work around that. It runs with full secret access against untrusted code — a known exfiltration path.

Efficiency

concurrency with cancel-in-progress on pull request workflows.
Cache the dependency manager via setup-node.

Deployment

Separate workflow, triggered by tag or manual dispatch.
Target a GitHub environment with required reviewers. Do not deploy automatically from every green build.

As each tool receives it

The same guidance, in the shape each editor reads. Cursor and Claude Code are written separately by hand; the rest are derived from the Cursor rule.

→ .cursor/rules/github-actions.mdchand-written for this tool

.cursor/rules/github-actions.mdc

---
description: GitHub Actions conventions
globs: [".github/workflows/**"]
alwaysApply: false
---

# GitHub Actions

## Secrets

- Repository or environment secrets only. A secret committed to a workflow file
  is leaked to everyone with read access, and rewriting history does not undo it.
- Never echo a secret, and never pass one into an untrusted action.

## Permissions

```yaml
permissions:
  contents: read
```

Set explicitly at the top of every workflow. The default is broader than any
test job needs, and a compromised action inherits whatever the job holds.

## Actions

- Pin third-party actions to a **commit SHA**, not a tag. Tags are mutable, and
  the action runs with access to your secrets.
- First-party `actions/*` at a major version tag is acceptable.

## Fork pull requests

- `pull_request` deliberately withholds secrets from forks.
- **Never** switch to `pull_request_target` to work around that. It runs with
  full secret access against untrusted code — a known exfiltration path.

## Efficiency

- `concurrency` with `cancel-in-progress` on pull request workflows.
- Cache the dependency manager via `setup-node`.

## Deployment

- Separate workflow, triggered by tag or manual dispatch.
- Target a GitHub environment with required reviewers. Do not deploy
  automatically from every green build.

What else this module writes

Selecting GitHub Actions contributes more than a rule file — all of it merged with every other module you pick, with conflicts resolved rather than duplicated.

Environment

CIoptionalSet by the runner. Use it to skip prompts and enable machine-readable output.

conflicts withGitLab CI

Put this in your repo

Adds GitHub Actions to a project this tool generated, without starting over. Files you have hand-edited are left alone.